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Abstract // is well established that the public has the right to use certain marine
resources, including fish stocks, beaches, and marine waters, for certain purposes,
including recreational fishing. Rights in public resources are held "in trust" by
federal and state governments for the public, both now and in the future. Given
public rights, we not only argue that minimum willingness-to~accept-compensation
(WTA) is the theoretically correct measure of economic damages when a publicly
owned marine resource is injured, but that it is, in fact, feasible to measure WTA,
and therefore, WTA should be used to estimate compensation. Two utility-theoretic
approaches for welfare analysis, which use Hausman's (1981) method and the
contingent valuation method, are outlined.
Keywords willingness-to-accept-compensation, natural resource damages, marine
pollution, recreational ftshing, contingent valuation method, public trust doctrine
Introduction
It is well established that the public has the rigbt to use and otherwise enjoy certain
maritie resources, including fish stocks, beaches, and marine waters, for certain pur-
poses, including recreational fishing. These public rights are distinct from private rights
in marine resources in that they are held collectively by the public and protected and
managed by federal and state governmental "trustees" for the benefit of the public, both
now and in the future. As a result of these public rights, it is increasingly argued by legal
scholars and others that the public is entitled to compensation in the form of economic
damages when publicly owned marine resources are injured (e.g.. Dower and Scodari
1987).
Although economists concede that, in principle, the minimum that one is willing to
accept in compensation (WTA) is the appropriate measure of economic damages when
publicly owned natural resources are injured, maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) or
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changes in Marshallian surplus (S) generally are used when actually estimating economic
damages (Dwyer et al., 1977; Yang et al. 1984). Recently, Assaf et al. (1986), in their
outline of nonmarket valuation of accidental oil spills, defended this void between theory
and practice by arguing that WTA is too difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Further-
more, they invoke Willig's (1976) benchmark discourse on "consumer surplus without
apology" when remarking that changes in Marshallian surplus, compensating variation,
and equivalent variation are all statistically similar anyway. In contrast to these argu-
ments, however, recall Bockstael's and McConnell's (1980) findings that, for losses of
natural resource commodities that have few if any close substitutes, WTA could be
considerably greater than WTP and S. Furthermore, Hausman (1981) and others explain
how to measure WTA with no more information than required to estimate a Marshallian
demand model. In our article, we argue for using WTA when estimating compensation
for injury to publicly owned marine resources.
Whether WTA can be measured and is greater than WTP and S is much more than an
intellectual curiosity as can be seen in Mishan's discourse (e.g., 1974) on common law
property doctrines and "amenity rights." Furthermore, the focus on WTA is sharpened
by the continued spread of marine pollution and habitat losses and by legal and philo-
sophical principles that both bolster the public's rights to marine resources and, accord-
ingly, maintain that damages to publicly owned natural resources must be redressed in a
manner consistent with public ownership. That is, when applicable, the public's right to
marine (and other natural) resources could have a significant effect on damage estimates,
especially when the resources lack close substitutes or when they actually are differenti-
ated commodities that support a variety of personal use and nonuse, or existence values
such as preservation of wildlife and bequests of ample resources to future generations.'
Although legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts ultimately constrain economic
assessments and decide what constitutes "costs" and "fair" damages, economists
should promote damage measures that are both compatible with legal and philosophical
principles and are also consistent with utility theory.
In order to avoid confusion, we stress that our focus is on the measurement of
economic damages that are not revealed in markets for single goods with close
substitutes—we do not address economic efficiency per se. Whether the restoration,
mitigation, or replacement of an injured tnarine resource is potentially Pareto optimal is
a separate (but obviously related) matter. Accordingly, we restrict our attention to the
proper measure of economic damages arising from injuries to marine resources, where
by injury we refer to physical, chemical, thermal, and other destructive changes to
publicly owned marine resources caused by private parties. We also distinguish between
measures of economic damages and the methodologies used to make such measure-
ments. Specifically, we address the necessity and feasibility of estimating WTA, but
refrain from providing yet another review of nonmarket valuation methodologies.^ Fi-
nally, our discussion focuses on use and existence values derived from publicly owned
marine resources. Private damages are excluded from this paper.^
In the next section, we outline the legal basis for the public's use and enjoyment of
certain marine resources, and we highlight recent trends in the expansion of such public
rights. From these legal (and philosophical) principles, the third section argues for
estimating WTA whenever measuring economic damages to publicly owned marine re-
sources. Section four illustrates how easily WTA can be estimated by applying Haus-
man's "exact" procedure to a Marshallian demand model for marine recreational fish-
ing, and it discusses how WTA can be derived from WTP models in contingent valuation
studies. The finally section summarizes and concludes the article.Injury Compensation for Marine Resources 29
Public Rights in Marine Resources
As Sax (1970) so eloquently stated, "Certain interests are so particularly the gifts of
nature's bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the populace." Although
many property rights have been transferred into private ownership, some have been
retained by the public for the use and enjoyment of current as well as succeeding genera-
tions. The collective ownership of these public rights is overseen by state and federal
governments acting in the capacity of "trustee" for the protection and management of
such rights.
One area in which the property rights of the public has been well documented is in
the case of marine resources. Specifically, the public holds rights that are distinct from
privately held rights in certain marine resources such as fish stocks, marine waters, and
beaches for certain purposes, including recreational fishing. The legal underpinnings of
these puhlic rights stem from several sources, including common law property doctrines,
state constitutions, case law, and state and federal statutes such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). These sources
are briefly highlighted in what follows.
Of the several common law property doctrines that concern the rights of the public in
marine resources, the most well known is the public trust doctrine. Developing out of
the public's need for access to navigable waters and shorelands for the purposes of
navigation and fishing, the doctrine focuses on the rights of the public in tideland areas
(i.e., submerged lands and the water above), the foreshore (i.e., the land between the
ordinary high watermark and the low watermark), and other navigable waters for these
public uses (Rodgers 1977; Stevens 1980).
Under the public trust doctrine, the state, as "trustee" of the public's rights, has an
affirmative duty to manage trust resources consistent with such public purposes and to
avoid the impairment of such public uses. In addition, the state must protect public
values in trust resources, including use as well as nonuse values. Thus as Huffman
(1986) has summarized, "[t]he doctrine's central idea is that the state is limited in its
disposition and management of particular resources; that the state holds those resources
in trust for the public and must dispose of or manage those resources consistent with that
trust."
The rights of the public in marine resources are also established by state constitu-
tions. For example, the constitutions of the states of Alaska, California, and Washington
declare that the "waters of the state" (a term that includes marine waters) belong to the
public* The public's rights in marine resources, however, are most well developed on a
state-by-state basis by case law. Several recent cases that illustrate these rights are
highlighted below.
In the late 1970s, a controversy arose in Oregon concerning the extension of an
airport runway that would involve the filling of a tideland area. The importance of
maintaining the state's tidelands and other navigable waters for its people in a natural
unaltered condition was described by the Oregon Supreme Court:*
The severe restriction of the power of the State as trustee to modify water
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public uses of
such waters and lands but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of
the resource and its fundamental importance to our society and to our envi-
ronment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, the
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once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public, and,
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public
trustee.
Also in the late 1970s, it was ruled by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the
tideland areas could not be permanently conveyed into private ownership. Although the
court found that title to tideland property could in fact be conveyed to a private owner,
the title nonetheless was burdened by an "implied condition subsequent" that the prop-
erty be used for the public purpose for which the land was originally granted, namely for
access to marine waters for navigation, fishing, and other uses.*
A similar decision was reached by the Supreme Court of Alaska in CWC Eisheries,
Inc.. V. Bunker 1755 P.2d 1115 (Ak. 1988)1, involving an action for trespass brought by
a private coastal land owner against a commercial fisherman. The court found that
tidelands conveyed to private owners were conveyed subject to the public's rights to
utilize such lands for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishing (the court called
such property rights "public easements"). Thus the court held "[w]hile Iprivate owners]
are free to make such use of their property as will not reasonably not interfere with these
continuing public easements, they are prohibited from any general attempt to exclude the
public from the property by virtue of their title" [755 R2d 1121 (AK. 1988)].
Two recent cases in Washington also illustrate the nature of public rights in marine
resources. In Caminiti v. Boyle [732 P.2d 989 (Wa. 1987)], the Washington Supreme
Court found that although the state has the power to dispose of its ownership of tidelands
and shorelands, this is subject to the paramount right of the public in navigation, fishing,
and recreation in such areas. The court thus categorized two separate property
interests—a private property interest, which can be bought and sold, and a puhlic author-
ity, which is inalienable.
In Orion Corp. v. State [747 R2d 1062 (Wa. 1988)], the Washington Supreme Court
held that the public's interest in tideland areas resembles a covenant running with the
land for the benefit of the public, which cannot be negated by the state. Therefore, the
court found that such tidelands may not be used or developed in a manner in which the
public's right of navigation, fishing, and other incidental uses is substantially impaired.
State statutes codify the rights of the public in marine resources. For example, in
Massachusetts the public trust doctrine has been codified to require all projects in state
tidelands to "serve a proper public purpose and that said purpose shall provide a greater
benefit than public detriment to the rights of the public in said lands."' In addition, the
statute requires the state to maintain a fiduciary responsibility to the public regarding the
management of such lands (Lahey 1985).
In Oregon a statute was enacted that in essence codified the 1969 decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay 1462 P.2d 671 (1969)] concerning
the rights of the public in shoreline areas.^ Specifically, the court found (and the statute
provides) that the public has an easement for recreational purposes in the shoreland area
between the mean high tide line and the visible line of vegetation based upon the com-
mon law doctrine of customs.
Several federal statutes also document the rights of the public in marine resources.
Notably, in the natural resource damage provisions of CERCLA, federal and state gov-
ernments are designated as trustees for public natural resources and are charged with the
affirmative responsibility of seeking damages for injuries to such natural resources
(Carlson 1988; Dower and Scodari 1987; Yang et al. 1984).
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for several purposes, including recreational fishing, navigation, and other uses. As the
result of these property rights, it is widely accepted that the public is entitled to adequate
compensation when such resources are injured.
On Estimating Willingness-to-Accept Compensation
In our view, legal principles that stem from, for example, the public trust doctrine and
statutes such as CERCLA clearly recognize, and are intended to protect, public owner-
ship of marine resources. Damages caused by pollution (e.g., oil spills and waste dis-
posal) and habitat degradation contravene public rights and, thereby, lower the personal
welfare of recreationists and those who have existence values. It follows, then, that
measures of economic damage that are compatible with public ownership and trusteeship
must be contingent upon the level of personal utility that precedes an injury. Accord-
ingly. "[aJs long as the government resources are viewed as publicly owned, the value is
the minimum compensation required by those who use the present facilities [e.g., re-
sources]" (Dwyer et al. 1977).
To set the stage for the remainder of this article, consider Figure 1 and how an injury
to fish stocks or water quality might increase travel costs for, say, marine recreational
fishing. Prior to injury, travel costs to the usual fishing site are C" and the number of
fishing trips is R'^ (Fig. Ib). In our exercise, however, injury to the marine environment
at the original site causes the user to travel to a farther site where resource quality is
equal to preinjury conditions at the previously preferred site. In our exercise, travel
costs increase to C', trips decrease to R', and utility decreases from U" to U'. The
demand curves corresponding to these travel costs are the Marshallian demand curve (D)
and the Hicksian demand curves associated with the original level of utility (H") and the
postinjury, lower level of utility (H'). Also, M is income and Y is expenditure on all
other commodities.
Figure 1 can be used to define WTA for two situations. First. WTA is the increase in
income that the person requires to condone an increase in travel costs but, at the same
time, remain on the original utility frontier, U**.^ With an increase in travel costs from C"
to C', WTA is defined according to the indirect utility functions, U"[C°,M] - l/[C',M
+ WTA], and is shown by area C'bcC" behind demand curve H*^ in Figure Ib. This
area, which is the compensating variation of welfare change, clearly is greater than the
corresponding change in Marshallian suTpIus (i.e., area C'acC*^. It follows, therefore,
that WTA is also greater than the equivalent variation (i.e., area C'adC**), or the maxi-
mum that the person is willing to pay to prevent the increase in travel costs to C'. In this
context, WTP is defined according to U'lC',M] - U'[C^M - WTP]. Note, however,
that utility is held constant at the postinjury, lower level (i.e., at U'), thereby implicitly
ignoring the person's right to the publicly owned marine resource. Yet, analyses such as
Assaf et al.'s (1986) recent discussion of economic damages caused by accidental oil
spills and, curiously, CERCLA's natural resource damages program implicitly adopt this
postinjury, lower level of utility when recommending the use of WTP and S to measure
economic damages.
In the second situation, we ask what is the minimum increase in income that the
person is willing to accept to continue to endure the increased cost of marine recreational
fishing already caused by the injury? WTA is still defmed according to the relationship,
U"[C",M] = U"[C',M + WTA], but in this case it is the equivalent variation of welfare









Figure 1 Stylized preferences for recreational fishing.
(a) Utility, (b) Demand.
larly, the persons's WTP to return to the original travel costs, C°, is still defined by
U'[C',M] - U'[C^M - WTPJ, hut WTP is the compensating variation in this case.'"
Furthermore, the utility level for WTP is still the postinjury level even though travel
costs are again C".
Whether WTA is the compensating variation or equivalent variation (or compensat-
ing surplus or equivalent surplus, where applicable) may not be important, but it is clear
from Figure 1 that WTA is greater than S and even greater than WTP. Consequently,
using WTP collected from, say, a contingent valuation study to establish economic dam-
ages is even more biased than using S. Nevertheless, Willig's argument that the three
empirical measures of welfare change will be statistically similar often is used to ration-
alize the use of S and WTP instead of WTA. We argue, however, that there are at least
four reasons to reject this pragmatic retreat from estimating WTA. First and foremost,
even when Willig's rules of thumb are satisfied, WTA is still greater than WTP and S,
and it is the correct measure of compensation for injury to publicly owned natural
resources."Injury Compensation for Marine Resources 33
Second, the alleged statistical similarity between S and WTA (and WTP) is suspect
when applied to injured natural resources, particularly when there are no close substi-
tutes. Willig's analysis best fits price changes in markets for single goods or services that
have close substitutes. However, when natural resources contribute substantially to a
persons's welfare (e.g., the ratio of S to income is large), there can be significant
differences between WTA, S, and WTP depending on the size of the reduction in recrea-
tional trips and the availability of close substitutes (Bockstael and McConnell 1980;
Hanemann, 1980; Mishan 1974). In addition, marine resources often are commodities.
vis-a-vis single goods or services. That is, marine resources often support a variety of
persona! use and existence values that are simultaneously compromised by injuries.'^
A third reason—one that actually corroborates the above argument—is that contin-
gent valuation studies consistently report WTA to be substantially greater than WTP. For
example, ratios of WTA to WTP summarized by Cummings et al. (1986) range from 3:1
to 10:1. Perhaps most important, though, is Bishop et al.'s (1983) study in which WTA
collected from actual cash transactions in a simulated market was three times greater
than WTP collected from a hypothetical, contingent market.'^ Furthermore, WTA sur-
veys typically elicit considerably more "protest" bids, including "infinite" and "not-
for-sale" valuations, than do WTP surveys—more than 50% of total responses com-
pared to iess than 10% in WTP surveys. Certainly, one reasonable interpretation of
protest bids is that they register the public's strong perception of inalienable rights to
certain natural resources (Meyer 1979).
Although subject to measurement error, the large differences between WTA and
WTP—particulariy those reported in recent contingent valuation studies—cannot be
shrugged off hastily. We disagree with Assaf etal. (1986) and others who casually reject
the credibility of the contingent valuation method. Many initial concerns about response
biases, including unsubstantiated incentives for strategic behavior (but not found, for
example, in Bohm's [1972] study even when encouraged), have been mollified by exten-
sive testing and refinement of the methodology (Mitchell and Carson 1989). For exam-
ple, recently, economists have improved sampling and questionnaire designs (e.g., Des-
vousges et al., 1983), experimented with more precise ways of eliciting (e.g., Boyle et
al., 1985; Brookshire and Coursey 1987) and analyzing (e.g., Hanemann, 1984) valua-
tion data, and established certain criteria, or "reference operating conditions," to judge
specific applications of the method (Cummings et al., 1986).'*
Finally, a fourth argument for estimating WTA is that WTA can be measured by one
of several techniques, most of which begin with an estimate of Marshailian demand.
Next, we tum our attention to measuring WTA.
An Illustration
Having argued for using WTA to measure natural resource damages, it is important to
illustrate the feasibility of deriving WTA from data on income, environmental quality,
and costs. There are at least four procedures available to empiricists. One procedure is
adding Willig's (1976) bounds to S or WTP." Alternatively, Vartia (1983) describes how
income elasticity can be used to transform a Marshailian demand model into Hicksian
demand.
In contrast, two utility-theoretic procedures can be used to derive "exact" formulae
for WTA. Hausman's (1981) "exact" procedure also begins with a Marshailian demand
model; however, WTA is derived—not approximated— from the implicit form of either34 S. F. Edwards and C. Carlson
the expenditure function or the indirect utility ftinction that matches demand. Notice that
the Hausman (1981) procedure presumes no more knowledge about utility functions than
that already implied by a Marshallian demand model.
The second utility-theoretic procedure begins with a utility model and then derives
expressions for demand and WTA. Hausman {1981) argues that his procedure has a
comparative advantage over beginning with a largely unknown utility function, however,
since the best-fitting functional form for demand can be selected through econometric
analysis. Accordingly, the Hausman procedure can be applied most fruitfully in travel
cost and hedonic demand studies. However, as proposed below, the approach that first
specifies a utility function will be especially useful in contingent valuation studies from
which estimates of parameters in WTP models can be used to derive WTA.'^
We begin with an illustration of the Hausman-procedure that is based on a semilog
travel cost model for shad fishing reported by McConnell and Strand (1981). This
demand model was selected because of the evidence that supports a semilog specification
of recreational demand models (McConnell 1985). and because it is specified with the
requisite variables: the natural logarithm of fishing trips |ln(R)], travel costs (C), catch
rate per trip (q), and a variable that reportedly represents income—namely, length of
boat (L). Specifically,
ln (R) - 0.16 - 0.01 C + 0.221 In (q + 1) + 0.O63L. (la)
For purposes of this exercise, assume that the relationship between L and income, M, is
(M/L) - 3,000. Accordingly, the demand model becomes
In (R) - 0.16 - O.OIC + 0.221 ln (q + 1) + 0.000021M. (Ib)
Following Bockstael et al.'s (1987) general case, the indirect utility function corre-
sponding to demand (Ib) is
U(C,q,M) e<""'
It follows from the general relationships, U"tC^q^M] - l/'[C',q',M + WTA] and
U'tC'q',M] - U'lC"q,^M - WTPJ, that were reported above and from the indirect
utility function (2), that for an increase in travel costs from C" to C',
WTA(C) (1/0.000021) ln((0.000021/-0.i) • (R[C - C"]
- R[C-C']) +1)/0.000021 (3a)
and
WTP(C) - (1/0.000021) ln((0.000021/-0.1) • (R[C - C']
- RtC - C"]) + 0/0.000021; (3b)
for a reduction in catch rate from q*" to q';
WTA(q) (1/0.000021) ln((0.00002I/-0.1) • (R[q - q'*]
- R[q - q']) + l)/0.000021 (4a)Injury Compensation for Marine Resources 35
and
WTP(q) - (1/0.000021) ln ((0.000021/-0.1) • (R[q - q'l
- R[q - q^) + 1)/0.000021; (4b)
and, finally, for both an increase in travel costs and a reduction in catch rate:
WTA(C,q) - -(1/0.000021) ln ((0.000021/-0.1) • (R[C = c"; q = q"]
- R[C - C'; q - q']) + l)/0.00002i (5a)
and
WTP(C,q) - (1/0.000021) In ((0.000021/-0.1) • (R[C -= C'; q = q']
- R[C - C"; q - q"]) + 1)/0.000021. (5b)
Equations (3a) and (3b) apply to anglers who travel farther to fish at a site with catch
rates equal to the preinjury site; equations (4a) and (4b) apply to anglers who continue to
fish at their original site but have a lower catch rate; and equations (5a) and (5b) are a
combination of both cases.
The changes in welfare reported in Tkble 1 were derived from the above equations.
Keep in mind that this illustration merely underscores the feasibility of estimating WTA
using the Hausman procedure; hence, the values reported in Table 1 do not suggest the
likely magnitude of differences among the welfare measures in general. Indeed, peculiar
results from common functional forms indicate that more research into demand specifi-
cation is needed. For example, in our exercise the change in Marshallian surplus due to a
change in catch rate cannot be completely measured because the semilog demand ap-
proaches the cost axis asymptotically. Consequently, the results in T^hle 1 for reductions
in catch rate were approximated by cutting off the intergration at R - 1 [i.e..
In (R) — 0]. Log-linear models will have the same prohlem. Concerning the linear
form, both WTA and WTP are equal to the product of the change in catch rate multiplied
by the ratio of the own-price and income coefficients (in absolute value). Without further
research, we can only speculate that variable-parameter models (e.g., Vaughn and Rus-
sell 1982) and flexible functional forms should he explored for modeling differences
between WTA, S, and WTP. See Hausman (1981) for advise on how to recover indirect
utility functions from well-behaved Marshallian demand models. For now, though, Tk-
ble 2 summarizes the expressions required to derive WTA from linear, semilog, and non-
linear demand models.'^
Unlike the Hausman procedure that begins with a Marshallian demand model, the
alternative utility-theoretic approach derives WTA from a utility function. As mentioned
above, this alternative will be especially useful in contingent valuation studies of natural
resource damages. For example, the Marshallian demand model corresponding to the
utility function,
U - 7 • ln(R) -I- ,3 • ln(X) - a • q • ln(R) + /3 • ln(X), (6)
and the simple budget constraint, M - X -I- C • R, is
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where X is the Hicksian bundle (i.e., all other goods), a and /3 are parameters, and 7 is a
variable parameter that depends on the value of catch rate, "q." Substituting demand (7)
into indirect utility function (6) yields the indirect utility function, which, as above, can
be used to solve for WTA and WTP corresponding to an increase in travel costs and a
reduction in catch rate:
WTA — e'''"'"<"* -( oq" - oq'lliKO +(*"
and
WTP - el''''"*'^' -(Q-qO - <,ql)ln(C) +(*')
where
T; — a • q + ^
and
0 = a • q • In (a • qiri) + /3 • ln(/3/»/).
The parameters shared by functions (8a) and (8b) provide a means to derive WTA from
the WTP model. In particular, estimates of the parameters in model (8b) can be used to
derive the values for a, ,3, and, through substitution into model (7b), WTA. As can be
seen, this indirect approach to measuring WTA overcomes problems with eliciting WTA
directly from the public.
Summary and Conclusions
We have outlined theoretical arguments (legal, philosophical, and economic) for why
WTA is the appropriate measure of economic damages when publicly owned marine
resources are injured and for why the differences between WTA and WTP and S for
natural resource commodities could be substantial. In addition, we emphasized how
WTA can, in fact, be derived indirectly from the same data ordinarily used to estimate
Marshallian and WTP demand models in travel cost, hedonic demand, and contingent
valuation studies. Although much research is needed into what specifications best cap-
ture preferences for publicly owned natural resources, expressions for the common
demand models are already available (Table 2). In addition, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to derive expressions for WTA from simple utility models such as model (6).
We want to emphasize that the natural resource damage assessment program estab-
lished pursuant to CERCLA represents a major step toward a coherent unification of
economics and law. Nevertheless, the program's present form contains several curious
restrictions on economic analysis. Notably, WTA was excluded from the final rule be-
cause, as we mentioned in the introduction, it is believed to be both too difficult to
measure and statistically similar to S and WTP anyway. We refuted the first reason
concerning measurement and the second reason concerning the size of WTA relative to
WTP is not supported by the evidence in the contingent valuation literature. Also, it is
contradictory that the program espouses public rights but sanctions WTP—which also is.Injury Compensation for Marine Resources 39
af^er all, a utility-theoretic measure of welfare—and, implicitly, the postinjury level of
well-being. As we hopefully made clear, the same information used to estimate WTP and
S can be used to derive WTA. Unless this logic and the methods are made understand-
able and accessible to courts and regulatory agencies, however, the public's welfare will
continue to erode as it is less than fully compensated for injuries to its marine resources.
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Notes
1. Existence values are personal nonuse benefits derived from preserving wildlife and from
providing future generations with ample natural resources, including amenities and environmental
quality.
2. See Dwyer et al. (1977) and Yang et al. (1984) for reviews of nonmarket and market-
related methodologies in the context of damage assessment.
3. For brevity, our scope excludes damages to commercial fisheries and to private property.
Losses in producer surplus of commercial fishing firms should be independent of property rights
assignments unless one allows for the possibility that fishermen also derive personal utility from
fishing. In contrast, using WTA to estimate damages incurred by owners of private property is a
logical extension of this paper.
4. See AK. CONST, art. Vm, ss3, $, 13, 14, 15, 16; CA. CONST art. X, ss 2, 4, 5; and
WA. CONST, art. XXI, si.
5. Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands. 58! P.2d 520. 524 (Ore. 1978). aff'd 590 P.2d
709 (1979).
6. Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
7. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91. ssl4. 18.
8. OR. REV. STAT. s390.610.
9. See Just et al. (1982) for a discussion of Hicksian welfare concepts.
10. In this exercise, we concentrate on situations when injuries to marine resource increase
the cost of using or providing publicly owned natural resources. We should point out, however,
that there may be situations when an injury imposes quantity restrictions on the public, in which
case compensating and equivalent surplus would be the relevant measure of welfare change, (see
Randall and Stoll 1980).
11. Willig's (1976) three rules of thumb involve the size of S relative to the income elasticity
of demand.
12. In the natural resources damages program of CERCLA. existence values and option
values are labeled "speculative" and, therefore, cannot be added to certain use values. See Dower
and Scodari (1987) for more details on these omissions and for reasons why the damage assess-
ment program of CERCLA is predisposed to underestimate natural resource damages. They do
not discuss the difference between WTA and WTP, however.40 S. F. Edwards and C. Carlson
13. Preliminary results from another study discussed by Boyie et al. (!985). indicate that for
the dichotomous choice type of valuation format, there is no significant difference between contin-
gent valuation estimates of maximum willingness-to-pay and actual cash transactions in a simu-
lated market for recreation. These results add to the credibility of the contingent valuation method.
14. The reference operating conditions recommend against eliciting WTA. However, as
shown below. WTA can still be derived from WTP if a utility-theoretic procedure is used to derive
the WTP model.
15. Bockstael and McConnell (1980) discussed the tendency for Willig's rules of thumb to be
invalidated by large changes in price. In fact, Willig's bounds do not exist within certain ranges of
price for the linear and log-linear model. However, Willig's bounds can be computed for the other
popular, semilog demand model.
16. One of the reviewers emphasized that although economists routinely apply the Hausman
(1981) and Vartia (1983) procedures to aggregate and average demand functions (e.g., average
number of fishing trips), these procedures should be applied only to the behavior of individuals.
Our exercises are based on behavioral models for individuals. How one would go about deriving
WTA from aggregate and average demand models is—as the reviewer points out—still unclear.
17. Notice that in the log-linear model reported in Table 2, the variable for catch rate enters
the indirect utility function along with the intercept.
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